Agents in a large population are randomly matched to play a certain game, payoffs in which represent fitness. Agents may have preferences that are different from fitness. They learn strategies according to their preferences, and evolution changes the preference distribution in the population according to fitness. When agents know the preferences of the opponent in a match, only efficient symmetric strategy profiles of the fitness game can be stable. When agents do not know the preferences of the opponent, only Nash equilibria of the fitness game can be stable. For 2 × 2 symmetric games I characterize preferences that are stable.
Introduction
The goal of this paper is to analyze stability of strategies and preferences in symmetric games under two-speed evolution. Two-speed evolution refers to the case when evolution of behavior for given preferences is much (infinitely) faster than evolution of preferences. Two-speed evolution is an extension of the indirect evolution approach of Güth and Yaari (1992) to multiple equilibria that are stable under evolution of strategies.
Indirect evolution works on preferences through stable strategies. A game is given by a function that for each strategy profile specifies fitness to the players. Each player is supplied with genetically programmed preferences over strategy profiles, represented by an expected utility function that does not necessarily coincide with the fitness function. When matched, players play the game given these preferences. Players arrive at a strategy combination of this subjective game by a learning process. Evolutionary success is determined by fitness players receive from playing this strategy combination. Different preferences lead to different strategies and to different fitness, and evolution selects preferences with higher fitness. I am interested in certain stable stationary points of this process.
The indirect evolution approach has been used before for certain games. For example, evolution of trust (Güth and Kliemt, 1998 ), evolution of fairness (Huck and Oechssler, 1999) , and evolution of reciprocity (Sethi and Somanathan, 2001 ) have been analyzed. However, the set of admissible preferences in those papers is assumed to be a one-dimensional subset of all possible preferences. This restriction may lead to results that are not robust to an enlargement of the set of admissible preferences (see Bester and Güth, 1998; Possajennikov, 2000) . Therefore, it is important to consider as large a set of admissible preferences as possible. I consider as admissible any preferences that can be represented by an expected utility function.
I define a population state as a distribution of preferences in the population and distributions of strategies in each subpopulation with given preferences, and I check for stability of population states against perturbations. Preferences that are present in a stable population state, and strategy profiles induced by such states, are called indirectly stable. I am interested in the following questions. Which preferences are indirectly stable for a given game? Are selfish preferences, that is, preferences whose utility function coincides with the fitness function, indirectly stable? Is an indirectly stable strategy profile an equilibrium of the fitness game? Is it efficient from the fitness point of view? For the first question, I give a relatively complete answer only for 2 × 2 games, since in larger games the set of admissible preferences is too large. Other questions can be answered quite generally.
I analyze two informational assumptions. In the complete information case players in a match know the preferences of the opponent. With incomplete information they know only the distribution of preferences in the population. The results are different: with complete information only fitness efficient strategy profiles can be stable, while with incomplete information only Nash equilibria of the fitness game can be stable. Selfish preferences are not necessarily stable with complete information, while with incomplete information they are (almost) always stable.
These results are in line with the results of similar models in Ely and Yilankaya (2001), Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001), and Dekel et al. (2004) . This paper can be considered as an extension of Dekel et al. as it also considers an infinite population playing a symmetric game, discrete distributions of preferences, and a static stability concept with respect to evolution of preferences. The main difference of my model is the consideration of two-speed evolution, that is, the requirement that the strategy combinations are 'stable' with respect to learning. To my knowledge, only in Sandholm (2001) twospeed evolution is explicitly considered, but the analysis there is restricted to certain 2 × 2 games and certain preferences. Another difference is in the formulation of stability in the incomplete information case, where I allow for small changes in the strategy of incumbents in the post-entry population. Compared with the results of Dekel et al. the first difference leads to a stronger condition for stability, while the second one leads to a weaker condition. These differences are illustrated on examples.
I formulate the model of two-speed evolution in symmetric games in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes the complete information case and Section 4 the incomplete information case. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model 2.1 Games
General Games
The basis for the analysis is a given finite two-player symmetric game G = (N, S, u), N = {1, 2}, u : S × S → R, u(s i , s j ) = u 1 (s i , s j ) = u 2 (s j , s i ). The payoff function u(·) is the fitness function and the game G is the fitness game. The mixed strategy extension ∆S of the strategy set S is denoted by Σ. Let |S| = m, σ i = (p i 1 , . . . , p i m ) ∈ Σ and let σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ Σ × Σ be a strategy profile. The fitness function u(·) extends to the set of mixed strategy profiles u(σ) = P m i=1 P m j=1 p 1 i p 2 j u(s i , s j ). A strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is symmetric if σ 1 = σ 2 . A symmetric strategy profile σ is efficient if for any other symmetric strategy profile σ 0 u(σ) ≥ u(σ 0 ). A symmetric strategy profile σ is strongly efficient if for any other strategy profile σ 0 (not necessarily symmetric) u(σ) ≥ u(σ 0 ). A correlated strategy profile σ c specifies the probability with which each pair of pure strategies is played, that is, σ c ∈ ∆(S × S), while a usual strategy profile σ ∈ ∆S × ∆S.
For a given strategy σ j of player j the best response BR i (σ j ) of player i is the set of such strategies σ i that for any other strategy
The best response correspondence BR maps each strategy profile
. A strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium if σ ∈ BR(σ). A Nash equilibrium σ is symmetric if σ is symmetric. A strategy σ i is a neutrally stable strategy (NSS) if
2 × 2 Games
Some of the results in the paper are for 2 × 2 games. A 2 × 2 symmetric fitness game is given by a symmetric bimatrix s 1 s 2 s 1 α, α β, γ s 2 γ, β δ, δ I focus on games where one symmetric pure strategy profile is more efficient than the other, α > δ.
1 By adding a constant to all payoffs and multiplying all payoffs by a positive constant, the game can be transformed into
The analysis is easily adapted for the case α = δ but it adds an extra case without much additional insight.
. These transformations do not affect efficiency of strategy profiles, the equilibria of the game or the notion of stability I use.
The following lemma is useful. I identify the mixed strategy σ i = (p, 1−p) with the probability p of playing s 1 .
Lemma 1 If b + c ≤ 2 the efficient symmetric strategy profile is (1, 1) with fitness 1; otherwise the efficient symmetric strategy profile is (p, p), where p = b+c 2(b+c−1)
, with fitness .
Proof. The fitness of both players in a symmetric strategy profile (p, p) is
The maximum of this expression with respect to
Substituting the values p * into the expression for fitness leads to the fitness values in the formulation of the lemma.
The class of symmetric 2 × 2 games can be divided into two subclasses according to whether the efficient symmetric strategy profile is pure or mixed. Further division can be done according to the best reply correspondence that determines equilibria. (c) 1 < c, b > 0. Hawk-Dove games. The unique symmetric equilibrium is mixed, but is generally not equal to the efficient symmetric strategy profile. They are equal only when b = c.
The efficient symmetric strategy profile is (s 1 , s 1 ).
(a) 1 ≥ c, b ≥ 0, at least one inequality is strict. If b > 0 the unique symmetric equilibrium is (s 1 , s 1 ), otherwise (s 2 , s 2 ) is also an equilibrium.
(b) 1 > c, b < 0. Coordination Problems: two pure symmetric equilibria (s 1 , s 1 ), (s 2 , s 2 ) and one mixed.
(c) 1 ≤ c, b ≤ 0, at least one inequality is strict. If 1 < c the games are Prisoner's Dilemmas: the unique equilibrium is (s 2 , s 2 ). Otherwise (s 1 , s 1 ) is also an equilibrium.
(d) 1 < c, b > 0. The unique symmetric equilibrium is mixed.
(e) 1 = c, b = 0. Any symmetric strategy profile is an equilibrium.
I want to find out which combinations of preferences and strategy profiles are indirectly stable for each type of games.
Preferences 2.2.1 General Games
Let G be a fitness game. Subjective preferences, which do not have to coincide with fitness, are similarly defined on the set of strategy combinations S × S. The preferences of agent i can be represented by a utility function v i : S×S → R. Utility functions are assumed to satisfy the axioms of expected utility. Then the utility function v i (·) extends to the set of mixed strategy profiles Σ × Σ in the straightforward way,
Any expected utility preferences are allowed. Thus the set of admissible preferences W G for a given game G is equivalent to the set R m 2 . In what follows I identify preferences with the utility function representing them.
Analogously with best responses with respect to fitness, best responses with respect to subjective preferences are defined. For a given strategy σ k ∈ Σ the best response BR i (σ k ) of a player with preferences v i is the set of such strategies σ i ∈ Σ that for any
2 × 2 Games
In 2 × 2 games it is convenient to divide admissible preferences into the following types:
, at least one inequality is strict;
Preferences belong to type k if utility function v i representing these preferences satisfies the inequalities for type k. For players with type St1 preferences the game has (possibly weakly) dominant strategy s 1 , while players of type St2 perceive s 2 as dominant. Type CO players (COordinators or COnformists) think that s 1 is best reply to s 1 and s 2 on s 2 . Type NC (NonConformists) players prefer to play s 1 against s 2 and s 2 against s 1 . Finally, there are preferences of type Ind (Indifferent) for which the strategies are equivalent. The players with such preferences are indifferent between strategies for any strategy of the opponent.
The subjective utility functions can represent many preferences. It is clear from the definition of types that such preferences as biases towards a particular strategy (Sandholm, 2001) , the desire to conform, and the desire to differ can be represented. Altruistic and spiteful preferences (Possajennikov, 2000) can be represented as well since one can compute the sum (or the difference) of fitnesses for each strategy combination. Preferences represented by any well behaved function of both players' fitness are admissible too. Note that the preferences of a player are independent of the preferences of the opponent; thus the reciprocal preferences of Levine (1998) and Sethi and Somanathan (2001) are not directly considered in this setup. However, their main property of being able to use in equilibrium different strategies against opponents with different preferences who nevertheless play the same strategy can be imitated by Ind type preferences.
Though players know their preferences, they do not need to know the fitness game. Evolution, described in the next subsection, will choose those preferences that have higher fitness.
Evolution
There is a large (infinite) population of agents randomly matched each period to play the given symmetric fitness game G. The agents are characterized by the subjective preferences they have, and by the strategies they play. Both the distribution of preferences in the population and the strategies used by the agents evolve. The change in strategies is, however, much faster, and is referred to as learning, while the change in the distribution of preferences is truly evolutionary.
With respect to learning I consider two models differing in informational assumptions. In a match, individuals either know the preferences of the opponent or they do not, but they know the distribution. The models differ significantly to be described separately in the following sections, though they have some common features. The differences also influence the evolutionary process on preferences, but in this section I highlight common points of evolution of preferences that are independent of informational assumptions. Suppose for the moment that given the strategies played by the agents one can calculate the expected fitness from playing the game.
I focus on states that contain a finite number of different preferences {v 1 , . . . , v n }. The state of the population at a given period of evolutionary time can be described by the proportions of players with each preferences, µ 1 , . . . , µ n , µ i > 0 ∀i, P n i=1 µ i = 1. Due to evolution the proportions change over time. Let the average (over different strategies employed in the subpopulations) expected fitness in the subpopulation of players with preferences v i from an encounter with a player with preferences v j be u ij . Then the average expected fitness of players with preferences v i is u i = P n j=1 µ j u ij . The main assumption on the evolutionary process is that it is monotone in the following sense: the proportion of players with preferences v i increases relative to the proportion of players with preferences v j iff u i > u j .
I do not specify the process further, but focus instead on stable stationary states. A state is stationary if the average fitness in all subpopulations is the same. I check which stationary states are robust against the appearance of an arbitrarily small proportion of mutants with some other preferences. Before specifying this evolutionary stability concept I formalize the learning process on strategies.
Complete Information

General Games
In this section the players in a match know the preferences of the opponent. Therefore they can use different strategies against opponents with different preferences. The state of the subpopulation of players with preferences v i at time t is described by the proportions of players that use each strategy s k against an opponent with preferences v j . Denote this proportion by x
The state of the population can be described by a 3-dimensional matrix 
In each subpopulation with given preferences there is a learning process. Due to this process the proportions of players using given strategies change over time. The learning process depends on the subjective preferences of the players. Learning in a match against a player with preferences v i is independent of learning in a match against a player with other preferences v j . Therefore there are n one-population learning processes for each subpopulation and
two-population learning processes, one for each pair of subpopulations. The learning processes are much faster than the evolutionary process on preferences, thus µ i 's are fixed from the point of view of learning.
The game between players with preferences v i and v j is a finite game
The best response correspondence maps each strategy
I assume that the learning processes can be represented by best response dynamics (Matsui, 1992) . This implies that only Nash equilibria can be steady states. Furthermore, I assume that players do not switch strategies if they already play best responses. This implies that the set of steady states coincides with the set of Nash equilibria. However, learning does not have to converge to a steady state. Not all steady states are limit points of trajectories that start not in the state, and thus not all steady states are reachable from an arbitrary starting state and not all steady states are stable with respect to small perturbations (experimentation). Ideally, the long run behavior of the trajectories of the learning processes should be analyzed, but this is very difficult to do in the general case considered here. As an approximation to dynamic stability I use instead the following notion.
If a steady state represents a strict equilibrium, it is asymptotically stable under best response dynamics. If there are alternative best replies, perturbations may make players switch to them. For the long run relevance of a steady state, if perturbations make players change to alternative best replies, learning should be able to lead back to the original state. The dynamic may recurrently visit states that are not equilibria, but the process spends sufficiently long (for evolution) time only at the states that are equilibria.
2
Instead of analyzing the dynamics explicitly, I use a static notion that, in my view, captures the dynamic intuition of the previous paragraph. Namely, I consider equilibria belonging to the minimal sets closed under rational behavior (curb; Basu and Weibull, 1991).
3
Definition 1 A set X of strategy profiles is closed under rational behavior (curb) in the asymmetric game between players with preferences v i , v j if X = Σ 1 × Σ 2 , where Σ i ⊂ Σ, i = 1, 2 are nonempty and compact, and BR i,j (X) ⊂ X. A minimal curb set is a curb set that does not contain any proper subset that is a curb set.
The definition has to be adapted for symmetric games.
Definition 2 A set X of strategy profiles is symmetric curb in the game between players with preferences v i if X = Σ 1 ×Σ 1 , where Σ 1 ⊂ Σ is nonempty and compact, and BR i,i (X) ⊂ X. A minimal symmetric curb set is a curb set that does not contain any proper subset that is a symmetric curb set.
Definition 3
The state {x ij , x ji } of the game between players with preferences v i and v j is learning stable if {x ij , x ji } induces a strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium and belongs to a minimal curb set in this game.
Definition 4
The state x ii of the game between players with preferences v i is learning stable if x ii induces a strategy profile that is a symmetric Nash equilibrium and belongs to a symmetric minimal curb set in this game.
I call an equilibrium that belongs to a minimal (symmetric) curb set 'learning stable equilibrium'. Now consider the whole population. The population state is learning stable if all games in it have reached learning stable states.
x ii is learning stable ∀i and pairs {x ij , x ji } are learning stable ∀i, j, i 6 = j.
Given the population state, the expected fitness of each subpopulation can be calculated. The expected fitness of a player with preferences v i against a player with preferences v j is
. Against a randomly chosen opponent, the expected fitness of a player with preferences v i is u i = P n j=1 µ j u ij . This is the average expected fitness of the subpopulation of players with preferences v i that is used for evolution.
A population state is stationary with respect to evolution if all subpopulations have the same average expected fitness u i . The selection process does not bring new preferences to the population. Any monomorphic population, that is, a population where all agents have the same preferences is stationary. Therefore I check the robustness of a state against the appearance of mutants.
∃ε * > 0 such that ∀ε ∈ (0, ε * ), ∀i, ∀x ik , x ki , x kk such that x kk is learning stable and {x ik , x ki } are learning stable,
The second part of the definition requires the state to be neutrally 4 stable against the appearance of an arbitrarily small proportion of mutants with arbitrary preferences, whose behavior, and the behavior of other players against them, is learning stable. This justifies the use of the term 'indirect' in the definition: stability with respect to the evolutionary process is affected only through learning stable behavior. Note that the relative proportions and the behavior of the incumbents against each other do not change after the appearance of the mutants. With probability (1 − ε) an incumbent is matched against another incumbent and gets on average the same fitness as before the appearance of the mutants. The inequality in the second condition in the definition can be rewritten as (1 − ε)u + εu ik ≥ (1 − ε) P j µ j u kj + εu kk , where u is the fitness incumbents get against each other (necessarily the same for all incumbents in a stationary state), u ik is the fitness incumbents i get against mutants, u kj is the fitness mutants get against incumbents j and u kk is the fitness mutants get among themselves. Thus one can compare first the fitness of incumbents among themselves and the fitness of mutants against incumbents, and only if they are equal, the fitness against mutants counts.
The notion of indirectly stable state will be the central notion in the paper. This notion of stability is a rather weak one, since it allows mutants to survive (though not to grow). Nevertheless, as will be shown, even this weak notion is often too restrictive.
A population state consists of preferences and strategies the players with these preferences use. Below I define when given preferences and given strategy profiles are considered stable. A given population state induces a symmetric correlated strategy profile. A pair of players with given preferences {v i , v j } is matched with probability µ i µ j . This match induces strategy profile (x ij , x ji ). Averaging over all matches, the induced strategy profile is
, which means that a given pure strategy profile (s k , s l ) is played with probability 
Proof. See Appendix A. In an indirectly stable state either all incumbents play the same strategy against each other, or, if they play different strategies, the strategies have the same fitness. Since in a population state players with given preferences play among themselves a symmetric strategy profile, the fitness in an indirectly stable state can be induced by a non-correlated symmetric strategy profile.
Still following the line of reasoning of Dekel et al. (2004) one shows that only efficient strategy profiles are indirectly stable, and that efficient strict Nash equilibria are indirectly stable. An inefficient strategy profile cannot be stable because mutants that are indifferent among strategies can imitate incumbents against other incumbents but can coordinate on the efficient outcome among themselves.
Lemma 3 If a symmetric strategy profile x is indirectly stable, then it is efficient.
Proof. See Appendix A. Preferences that do not lead to the play of the efficient symmetric strategy profile cannot be stable. The questions posed in the introduction have the following answers in the complete information case: selfish preferences are not always stable (since they play a Nash equilibrium of the fitness game and it is not necessarily efficient); stable strategy profiles are efficient.
A strict equilibrium of the fitness game can be supported by preferences regarding the equilibrium strategy as strictly dominant. A small proportion of mutants playing some other strategy does not erode the fitness advantage of the incumbent strategy.
Lemma 4 If a symmetric strategy profile x is efficient and it is a strict Nash equilibrium of the fitness game, it is indirectly stable.
Proof. See Appendix A. Players with indifferent preferences can always play the efficient symmetric strategy profile. However, even if they do so, such preferences are not stable if there exists an asymmetric strategy profile with a higher fitness for at least one player.
Lemma 5 Preferences that are indifferent among strategies are indirectly stable iff the symmetric efficient strategy profile is strongly efficient and there is no asymmetric strategy profile in which one player has the same fitness as in the efficient symmetric strategy profile while the other does not.
Proof. See Appendix A.
2 × 2 Games
For 2 × 2 symmetric games the notion of learning stability in one population has the following consequences. If one of the strategies is strictly dominant, the unique Nash equilibrium is strict and therefore learning stable. If the game has two pure strategy symmetric equilibria but one is in dominated strategies, the dominated equilibrium is not learning stable. In Coordination Problems the two pure strict equilibria are learning stable, while the mixed equilibrium is not. In Hawk-Dove games the unique symmetric mixed equilibrium is learning stable. In games with equivalent strategies any symmetric strategy profile is a learning stable equilibrium.
In previous section I divided preferences in 2×2 games into types. Players with preferences of type St1 play strategy s 1 in a one-population learning stable state; analogously players of type St2 play s 2 . A mixed strategy can be played in a one-population learning stable state only by players with preferences of types NC and Ind. By Lemma 5 preferences of type Ind cannot be stable if the symmetric efficient strategy profile is not strongly efficient. Since only efficient symmetric strategy profiles can be played in an indirectly stable state, I have to check only the states with efficient strategy profiles. , therefore preferences of type Ind cannot be stable by Lemma 5. Mutants of type St1 get b against preferences of type NC in a learning stable equilibrium, and mutants of type St2 get c against preferences of type NC in a learning stable equilibrium. Therefore preferences of type NC cannot be stable either.
Proposition 1
Consider now the case when b + c ≤ 2. Preferences of types St2 and NC cannot be stable because they never play the efficient symmetric strategy profile (s 1 , s 1 ). From Lemma 5 preferences of type Ind are stable iff b < 1, c < 1 or b = 1, c = 1. In these cases there is no possibility for a mutant to get fitness higher than 1, or get fitness 1 while incumbents get less, therefore preferences St1 and CO that play (s 1 , s 1 ) are indirectly stable as well.
In Prisoner's Dilemmas and other games with c > 1 preferences of type St1 are not stable since mutants of type St2 can appear and get c > 1 in a learning stable state. Let any preferences of type CO be characterized without loss of generality by the completely mixed strategy (σ CO , 1 − σ CO ) against which they are indifferent between s 1 and s 2 , and analogously any preferences of type NC can be characterized by the mixed strategy (σ NC , 1− σ NC ). The unique equilibrium (σ NC , σ CO ) of the game between players with preferences of type CO and preferences of type NC is learning stable. In this equilibrium the fitness of players with preference type NC is , preferences of type CO are indirectly stable, since in any equilibrium mutants have fitness not higher than 1 against them, and if it is 1, the incumbents also have fitness 1 against mutants.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 1 . The figure shows, for each type of fitness game, symmetric Nash equilibria, preferences that are indirectly stable, and strategy profiles that are indirectly stable. Any distribution of these preferences that play the indicated strategy profile is a stable population state. For example, in Coordination Problems (region II, 1 < c, b < 0) there are three symmetric equilibria, and preferences of types St1, CO, and Ind that play the efficient equilibrium (s 1 , s 1 ) are stable. In region I (1 > c, b > 0) the unique symmetric equilibrium is (s 1 , s 1 s 1 ) is also an equilibrium for them. In my model, however, such equilibrium is not learning stable. Small amount of experimentation inside the population of such players will upset this equilibrium and the play will never return back. The same holds for the result of Dekel et al. that in Hawk-Dove games with b = c the efficient mixed equilibrium can be supported by players of type CO. This equilibrium again is not learning stable. I consider it more natural to have, along with the possibility of mutations, also the possibility of experimentation. Arguably, experimentation with strategies happens more often than mutations in preferences. Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemmas is upset either by mutants who defect by 'conviction', or by experimentators who try defection as alternative best reply.
Discussion
Since I focus on learning stable states, a priori both incumbents and mutants are restricted in their choice of equilibria. However, since mutants can always be of the type that is indifferent between strategies (see the proof of Lemma 2), for whom any equilibrium is learning stable, the latter requirement does not restrict the mutants. Therefore, my stability requirement is stronger, and the set of indirectly stable strategy profiles of this paper is a subset of stable outcomes in Dekel et al. (2004) . In particular, mutual cooperation is not indirectly stable in Prisoner's Dilemmas.
It is hard for a population state to be indirectly stable. Since I consider all possible preferences, there are often mutants that upset a population state. Often there is no stable population state. In this case simulations can help to see what outcomes could be possible. Such an analysis for Prisoner's Dilemmas and Hawk-Dove games is provided in Possajennikov (2002) .
Though in 2×2 games only Nash equilibria of the fitness game are stable, it is not true in general. Consider 3 × 3 game is a learning stable equilibrium because the minimal curb set for them is the set of all strategies. Against any mutants that play s 3 , however, the incumbents play the weakly dominant strategy s 2 . Incumbents have fitness 1 among themselves and against mutants, and mutants have fitness 1 against incumbents. Since mutants cannot get fitness higher than 1 among themselves, the original monomorphic population is indirectly stable, and (s 1 , s 1 ), though not a Nash equilibrium of the fitness game, is indirectly stable.
Incomplete Information
General Games
If agents do not know the preferences of the opponent in a match, they cannot condition their strategy on those preferences. The state of the subpopulation of players with preferences v i at time t is described by a distribution of strategies that are used in any match, (x where the first row gives the proportions of preferences, column i corresponds to the distribution of strategies players with preferences v i use, and row j shows how often strategy s j is used. The state of the population is denoted
In each subpopulation there is a learning process that is based on the subjective preferences v i . However, all these processes are interconnected now into one one-population learning process. Each match corresponds to a two-player symmetric Bayesian game with incomplete information, in which players can be of n types v 1 , . . . , v n , a player knows own type and the distribution of opponent's types µ 1 , . . . , µ n , and the players simultaneously choose a strategy from Σ. I call the distributions of strategies (x i ) n i=1 the state of the Bayesian game. The population state induces a symmetric mixed strategy profile (x, x) in an obvious way, x = P n i=1 µ i x i . Since players cannot condition their strategy on their role, only symmetric states are possible. Learning is much faster than evolution, thus from the point of view of learning µ i 's are fixed.
I use the same notion of learning stability as in the complete information case. Its dynamic justification can be used in Bayesian games as well. The definition of curb sets can be easily extended to incomplete information games.
Let the distribution of types (µ i ) n i=1 be given. Let {z = (x 1 , . . . , x n )} = Σ n be the set of strategy combinations, with the interpretation that strategy x i is used by players of type v i . For given type v i and given z, the incomplete information best response BR in i (z) is the set of strategies that are best responses to the mixed strategy induced by the proportions of types in the population, i.e. the set of strategies σ ∈ Σ such that σ ∈ BR i ³ P n j=1 µ j x j´. The incomplete information best response correspondence maps strategy combination z to
is closed under rational behavior in the incomplete information game (curb in ) if Z is the product of non-empty compact subsets of Σ and BR in (Z) ⊂ Z. A minimal curb in set is the curb in set that does not contain any proper subset that is a curb in set. For given distribution of preferences (µ i )
is learning stable if it is a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium and belongs to a minimal curb in set of the game. I refer to a learning stable strategy combination as 'learning stable equilibrium'. A population state is learning stable if the strategy combination in it is learning stable given the distribution of preferences in the state.
of the Bayesian game is a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game and belongs to a minimal curb in set, given
The evolutionary process uses expected fitness. Players with preferences v i , if matched with players with preferences v j , get in expected terms
Before matching, the expected average fitness of players with preferences v i is u i = P n j=1 µ j u ij . The proportion µ i of players with preferences v i increase relative to the proportion µ j of players with preferences v j iff u i > u j . A population state is stationary with respect to the evolutionary process if all subpopulations have the same expected average fitness u i .
Like in the complete information case, any monomorphic population is stationary. Therefore I again check the robustness of a state against an appearance of mutants. Compared with the complete information case, there is an additional issue in defining indirect stability in the incomplete information case. With complete information, the incumbents did not need to change their strategies in games between themselves, therefore for a small proportion of mutants the strategy profile in a perturbed state was close to the strategy profile of the original state. With incomplete information, even with a small proportion of mutants, incumbents may change their strategy considerably in a new learning stable equilibrium. If there is no learning stable equilibrium close to the original one, the original state cannot be considered stable.
Let the distance between two mixed strategies x 1 = (x 1,1 , . . . , x 1,m ) and
} is indirectly stable with incomplete information if (i) it is learning stable;
The second part of the definition reflects the idea that after the appearance of mutants there exists a new learning stable strategy combination where incumbents play strategies close to their original strategies. I assume that such learning stable strategy will be learned. In each such new learning stable state of the game the incumbents should receive fitness not lower than that of the mutants.
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Analogously with the complete information case, I define indirectly stable preferences and indirectly stable strategy profiles. 
Compared with the definition in Dekel et al. (2004) , there is the same difference as in the complete information case: I allow only for learning stable equilibria. There is also another difference. Dekel et al. do not allow in a post-entry population equilibria in which incumbents play a strategy different from the one they played before the entry. I allow for small changes in the strategy of the incumbents, which is, in my view, an assumption that is more in line with the complete information case, when incumbents had time to learn the equilibrium strategy against the mutants. Dekel et al. mention this possibility, but they do not elaborate on its implications. I comment in the end of the section about the possibility of relaxing the informational assumptions further that would lead to the same results as in Dekel et al.
The definition is similar to the one of the complete information case and suffers from the same drawback as it allows mutants to have the same fitness as incumbents. Perhaps more important, since stability of preferences is defined through stability of population states that takes into account stability of strategies, it may lead to counterintuitive results, as I discuss at the end of the section.
The first result is that only Nash equilibria of the fitness game can be indirectly stable with incomplete information. If a strategy profile is not a Nash equilibrium, mutants that play a best response can appear, and since incumbents cannot adjust their strategy by much, they have lower fitness than the mutants.
Lemma 6 Suppose a symmetric strategy profile x is indirectly stable with incomplete information. Then it is a Nash equilibrium of the fitness game.
Proof. See Appendix B.
A sufficient condition for a Nash equilibrium to be indirectly stable with incomplete information is that it is in neutrally stable strategies. It can be supported, for example, by players that are indifferent among strategies, because such players can keep playing the original strategy in the new learning stable state.
Lemma 7 Suppose a symmetric strategy profile x is a Nash equilibrium of the fitness game in neutrally stable strategies. Then it is indirectly stable with incomplete information.
Proof. See Appendix B. Not all Nash equilibria are stable, and the result cannot be strengthened to the result of Dekel et al. (2004) 
The symmetric pure strategy combinations (s i , s i ), i = 1, 2, 3 are Nash equilibria but none of them is in neutrally stable strategies (Weibull, 1995, Ch.2). Consider a population state that induces equilibrium (s 1 , s 1 ). Consider a mutant for whom strategy s 2 is strictly dominant. If (s 1 , s 1 ) is indirectly stable, there exists a new learning stable state where the mutants play s 2 while the incumbents play a strategy close to s 1 . If the strategy of each incumbent type is at a distance not more than aε from s 1 , the average strategy of the incumbents is also in the aε-neighborhood of s 1 , and can be written as
. Then the expected fitness of the mutants is u m = (1 − ε)(1 − δ 3 ) + ε, while the expected average fitness of the incumbents is
, and for δ 2 ∈ [0,
Thus there are incumbents that have lower fitness that mutants, and so any population state that induces equilibrium (s 1 , s 1 ) is not stable. Analogous reasoning with obvious modifications applies to (s 2 , s 2 ) and (s 3 , s 3 ).
Example 2 A Nash equilibrium of the fitness game that is not in neutrally stable strategies but that is indirectly stable with incomplete information.
Consider a 2 × 2 Coordination Problem with 1 > c, b < 0. The mixed strategy equilibrium is not neutrally stable in this game. Consider the popu-
} with n = 1, consisting of players with preferences of type NC such that they play the mixed strategy equilibrium of the fitness game, σ NC = b b+c−1 . This population state is stable. Consider mutants that in a new learning stable state play strategy σ M . The incumbents are indifferent between strategies if their own strategy σ i is such that (1 − ε)σ i + εσ M = σ NC . In the post-entry learning stable equilibrium the incumbents play
. The fitness of the incumbents in the post-entry population is
Since σ NC is a completely mixed equilibrium of the fitness game, any strategy is best response to it, and any strategy has the same fitness against it. Thus the incumbents and the mutants have the same fitness, so the population state and the mixed equilibrium it induces are indirectly stable.
In the model of Dekel et al. (2004) only neutrally stable strategy profiles are stable. Example 2 shows that Nash equilibria that are not neutrally stable can be indirectly stable in the current model.
The following lemma states when the monomorphic population consisting of players with indifferent preferences is indirectly stable with incomplete information.
Lemma 8
The monomorphic population consisting of players that are indifferent among strategies is indirectly stable iff the players play a neutrally stable Nash equilibrium of the fitness game.
Proof. See Appendix B.
2 × 2 Games
In this subsection I apply the above results to 2 × 2 games. It is difficult to give complete characterization of indirectly stable preferences for polymorphic population states consisting of players with different preferences. I give results for monomorphic populations consisting of players all having the same preferences. In Coordination Problems (1 > c, b < 0) preferences of types St1, CO, St2, and Ind are indirectly stable when they play one of the pure equilibria of the game because one can choose a = 0 in the definition of indirectly stable population state. Example 2 shows that preferences of type NC are indirectly stable when the mixed equilibrium of the game is played. The idea of the example works also for Hawk-Dove games (1 < c, b > 0), thus preferences of type NC playing the mixed equilibrium are indirectly stable in such games. The mixed equilibrium in Hawk-Dove games is neutrally stable, so preferences of type Ind playing this equilibrium are indirectly stable by Lemma 8. Finally, in games with equivalent strategies (c = 1, b = 0) all players face the same distribution of strategies x. Since all strategies are equivalent, independently of which strategy incumbents and mutants use their expected fitness is the same, so any preferences are indirectly stable.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 2 . The figure shows that in 2 × 2 games any non-dominated Nash equilibrium can be supported by stable preferences. Note that in the model of Dekel et al. (2004) the mixed equilibrium of a Hawk-Dove game is not supported by the population of players with preferences NC since after the appearance of mutants the equilibrium of the Bayesian game has incumbents play a slightly different strategy. In my model such population state is stable, but then also some equilibria that are not neutrally stable, like the mixed equilibrium in Coordination Problems, become stable. ¢ . After the appearance of mutants for whom strategy s 1 is strictly dominant the unique equilibrium in which the incumbents play a strategy close to
¢ is not learning stable. If a curb in set includes s 3 for the incumbents, it also includes s 1 , and then also s 2 . However, the set ∆(s 1 , s 2 ) of mixed strategies not including strategy s 3 for the incumbents, together with the set {s 1 } for the mutants, is also a curb in set. Thus the fully mixed equilibrium with incumbents' strategy close to
¢ does not belong to a minimal curb in set. The monomorphic population consisting of players with selfish preferences is not stable with incomplete information in this game.
In the model of this paper stability of preferences is defined through sta-bility of population states that also takes into account stability of strategy profiles. Without the last requirement, an alternative definition could be as follows. Preferences are stable if there exists a population state such that after the appearance of mutants in any learning stable equilibrium incumbents have fitness not lower than the mutants. The difference is that now there is no restriction on how far the new strategy profile is from the old one. With this new definition the monomorphic population of players with selfish preferences is always stable, since after the appearance of mutants both incumbents and mutants face the same distribution of preferences in the population, and the selfish incumbents maximize fitness, hence having it not lower than the mutants.
With the original definition, however, the analysis in this section shows that in the incomplete information case the answers to the questions from the introduction are: selfish preferences are almost always stable (see the example above when they are not; this is a non-generic case); stable outcomes are Nash equilibria of the material payoff game; stable outcomes are not always efficient.
Ignorance
The following informational assumption can justify the requirement of Dekel et al. (2004) that incumbents continue to play the same strategy in the postentry state. The incumbents have had time to learn and have arrived to an equilibrium z according to their subjective preferences. Suppose now that a small proportion of mutants appears but the incumbents are ignorant of the arrival of the mutants. Since z is an equilibrium for incumbents, they continue playing the same strategy z. If the equilibrium z of the subjective game is not neutrally stable in the fitness game, there exists a strategy y ∈ Σ such that (1−ε)u(y, z)+εu(y, y) > (1−ε)u(z, z)+εu(z, y). Consider mutants that play y. The left hand side in the inequality above is the expected fitness of the mutants in the post-entry population, while the right hand side is the expected fitness of the incumbents. Thus the mutants have higher fitness than the incumbents and the original population state is not stable. On the other hand, if z is neutrally stable, for any strategy y of the mutants (1 − ε)u(y, z) + εu(y, y) ≤ (1 − ε)u(z, z) + εu(z, y), so the original population state inducing z is stable. Therefore a strategy profile z is stable under ignorance if and only if z is neutrally stable in the fitness game, the same result as in the model of Dekel et al.
Conclusion
By analyzing two-speed evolution of preferences and strategies, this paper shows which outcomes can be expected when a game is being played over and over again. One of the results is that if information is complete, only efficient outcomes can be stable. The complete information case can be interpreted as the situation when players can credibly commit to a certain behavioral rule (their preferences) and communicate the commitment to the opponent. Though the connection between commitment and efficiency is not new (see e.g. Frank, 1987) , the indirect evolution approach of this paper links commitment to preferences, allowing richer behavior, not just a commitment to an action. It shows that this connection is of quite a general nature in the realm of games played by randomly matched pairs.
On the other hand, this connection is far from perfect: in Prisoner's Dilemmas and Hawk-Dove games there are no indirectly stable states, so efficiency is not achieved. The introduction of learning together with evolution makes it more difficult to sustain efficient strategies than in the model of Dekel et al. (2004) . And of course the efficiency result depends on the possibility to communicate the commitment: in the incomplete information case there is no connection between efficiency and stable outcomes.
An important limitation of the analysis, in my view, is the use of static concepts of evolution. Moreover, it is further restricted to finite preference distributions and checked only against particular perturbations. It is possible to formulate explicitly a dynamic process of evolution, together with a dynamic process of learning, but the analysis is hard due to the infinite space of possible preferences. With the help of simulations, however, one can achieve some insight, particularly in the case when there are no stable preferences, as in Prisoner's Dilemmas and Hawk-Dove games. This possibility is developed in Possajennikov (2002) .
Another limitation is the strong assumptions on information agents have: either they observe opponent's preferences perfectly, or not at all. Dekel et al. (2004) consider also the intermediate case when a player observes opponent's preferences with given probability p. Some of the results go through: if p is close to 1, the situation resembles the complete information case while when p is close to 0, it is similar to the incomplete information case. But there are also differences, as Dekel et al. show, since a strict Nash equilibrium may be indirectly unstable for any p if it is not efficient. These results are quite intuitive and likely to hold also in the extensions of the models of this paper; however, the full analysis is complicated and left for future research. Another possibility is to consider the case with a given (costly) technology to obtain (or hide) preference information. The evolutionary process can then be expanded to information acquisition. An analysis of such a model for a simple trust game is given in Güth et al. (2000) ; it would be interesting to extend the analysis to other games.
A Proofs for Complete Information
Lemma 2 In an indirectly stable population state u i = u j = u ij ∀i, j.
Proof. Let mutants be of the type that is indifferent among all strategies. Suppose that players with preferences v i get the highest fitness against players with preferences v j , i.e. u ij = max k u kj . Let mutants play against players with preferences v j the same strategy as players with preferences v i do, and let players with preferences v j play the same strategy against mutants as they did against the preferences v i . This state of the game between mutants and players with preferences v j is learning stable. In the same way let mutants imitate against each incumbent type the subpopulation that plays a strategy that has the highest fitness against this incumbent type. Such states of the games between mutants and incumbents are learning stable. Then mutants achieve fitness composed of maximal fitness against each incumbent, and so, unless all other incumbents also achieve the same fitness, mutants have higher fitness than incumbents. Thus against a given incumbent type other incumbents should have the same fitness.
Suppose now that ∃v i , v j such that u ij < u i . From the reasoning above u jj = u ij < u i . Consider again mutants that are indifferent among all strategies. Let mutants play the same strategy against everybody as players with preferences v j play, and let mutants play among themselves a strategy that players with preferences v k play among themselves, where v k is such that u kk = u ik > u i . The fitness of players with preferences v j and mutants against incumbent types is the same. Against mutants the players with preferences v j get u jj while mutants get fitness equal to u ik > u i > u jj .
Proof. It follows from Lemma 2 that one needs to consider only noncorrelated symmetric profiles. Suppose there exists an inefficient strategy profile that is indirectly stable. Then there exists an indirectly stable population state that induces the inefficient strategy profile. Consider mutants that are indifferent among all strategies. Suppose they imitate the behavior of incumbents everywhere, and play the efficient strategy profile among themselves. Such mutants will have higher fitness than incumbents, therefore the population state is not indirectly stable.
Proof. Consider a monomorphic population of players for whom the pure strategy of the efficient strategy profile is dominant. If mutants appear, the incumbents continue to play the same strategy. Since it is a strict Nash equilibrium, mutants can achieve the same payoff against incumbents only by playing the same strategy. Then both mutants and incumbents play the same strategy and have the same fitness.
Proof. Consider mutants that are also indifferent among all strategies. All strategy profiles, including asymmetric ones, are learning stable equilibria of the game between mutants and incumbents. If the efficient strategy profile is not strongly efficient, mutants can achieve fitness of the asymmetric strategy profile, higher that the incumbents are getting. If there is no such asymmetric strategy, mutants cannot achieve higher fitness than that of the incumbents. If there is asymmetric strategy with the same fitness for one player but lower for the other, by playing it mutants can achieve the same fitness as incumbents do against incumbents, and play the efficient symmetric strategy profile among themselves. Incumbents then have lower fitness against mutants and thus the state is not indirectly stable.
B Proofs for Incomplete Information
Proof. Consider a population state {(µ
Suppose x is not a Nash equilibrium of the fitness game. Then there exists a strategy y that has higher fitness against x than x has against itself, u(y, x) > u(x, x). Suppose that mutants for whom strategy y is strictly dominant appear. In any learning stable state the mutants play the dominant strategy y. If there is no learning stable strategy combination in which incumbents play strategies that are close to x, then the original population state is not indirectly stable.
Consider now any new learning stable strategy combination where incumbents play (possibly different) strategies z i such that d(z i , x i ) ≤ aε ∀i. The aggregate strategy of the incumbents is z = P n i=1 µ i z i . Then it holds that u m − u i > 0, thus there exist incumbents that have lower fitness than the mutants and so any state that induces x is not stable.
Proof. Consider population state {(µ i ) n i=1 , (x i ) n i=1 } with n = 1, and the incumbent players have preferences of the type that is indifferent among strategies. After the appearance of mutants, there are learning stable states in which incumbents play x, thus one can take a = 0 in the definition of indirectly stable state. If the mutants play a strategy y different from x in a learning stable state, the expected fitness of the incumbents is u i = (1 − ε)u(x, x) + εu(x, y), while that of the mutants is u m = (1 − ε)u(y, x) + εu(y, y). Clearly, u i ≥ u m for sufficiently small ε by the definition of neutral stability. If the mutants play x, then the incumbents and the mutants have the same fitness, so the population state and the induced strategy profile x are indirectly stable.
Lemma 8
Proof. By Lemma 7 if players that are indifferent among strategies play a neutrally stable equilibrium x, the monomorphic population state is stable. If they play x that is not neutrally stable, there exists y such that (1 − ε)u(y, x) + εu(y, y) > (1 − ε)u(x, x) + εu(x, y). Consider mutants that play strategy y in the new learning stable state. Their fitness is higher than the fitness of the incumbents.
